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TRANSIT PROBLEMS OF THREE ASIAN LAND-LOCKED
COUNTRIES: AFGHANISTAN, NEPAL AND LAOS
Martin Ira Glassner*

1.

INTRODUCTION

There are at present some thirty land-locked states in the world,
depending on whether one counts such entities as Andorra and Vatican City as "states." Of them, fourteen, or nearly half, are in Africa,
five are in Asia, two in South America and the rest in Europe. All
but those in Europe are poor and sixteen are tallied among the "least
developed" countries in the world by United Nations reckoning.
The sixteen represent not only half of all the land-locked countries,
but more than half of the twenty-nine least developed. These proportions are not coincidental.
A location in the interior of a continent tends to isolate a country from the main world flows of goods, people and ideas. Interior
countries lack the "window on the world" that a seaport provides.
Once isolation was valued, for it provided some measure of security
against a wide range of dangers from foreign invaders to hurricanes.
Now, however, isolation is a clear disadvantage.
Even if there were no political, strategic or social handicaps to
being land-locked, the economic consequences would be serious
enough. First of all, sheer distance from the sea, which still carries
most of the world's international commerce, means high transport
costs. Compounding the problem of distance is the nature of the
terrain: most land-locked states are separated from the sea by high
mountains, steep ravines or escarpments, dense forests or long
stretches of sparsely-populated country that neither produce nor
consume very much.
Typically, partly because of topographic features, partly because of colonial transport policies and partly because of the poverty
of most land-locked and transit states, the transport systems used by
land-locked countries are inadequate in facilities, maintenance and
management. Frequently there are serious imbalances in the direc• Professor and Chairman, Department of Geography, Connecticut State College,
New Haven, Conneticut. Professor Glassner served as an observer for the International
Law Association (London) to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea.
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tion or seasonal flow of goods as well. Communications, essential to
keep traffic flowing smoothly, often are inadequate or unreliable,
making traffic management very difficult. Delays in transit, caused
by these circumstances, not only increase direct costs such as insurance, storage, interest on loans, penalties and other charges, but also
increase the risk - and the actuality - of loss, theft, damage and
deterioration. Merchants at either end of a trading relationship can
lose a great deal of money when delays in transit mean goods arrive
too late to be useful or saleable. Construction projects can be
delayed and machinery and vehicles immobilized, all for want of
materials, equipment or parts that are lost, damaged or delayed in
transit.
None of these problems is peculiar to land-locked countries; all
are suffered by the interior districts of developing coastal states as
well. What compounds these problems for the land-locked states is
that between them and the sea is at least one international boundary,
sometimes more. This means that the transit states can, and often
do, impose complicated transit and customs formalities, excessive
documentation and even, at times, higher charges for traffic in transit
than for domestic traffic. Not only do goods in transit, therefore,
have to endure cumbersome procedures and high costs at the ports,
but also at the border, and this increases the time and cost of transit.
These and other problems can be reduced, though never eliminated entirely, if the land-locked state either has several alternate
routes to the sea or is on excellent terms with its transit state or
states. Happily, one or both of these conditions normally prevails in
most land-locked States. There are, however, many examples of
transit routes being deliberately blocked for varying periods and, despite transit agreements, interferences with transit - deliberate or
accidental - always lurk in the background as real possibilities.
Clearly, political as well as economic factors are important in determining the true significance of land-lockedness in individual cases.
In addition to political and economic factors, psychological factors may intensify the very real handicaps of having no seacoast.
Seaports, the "windows on the world" mentioned previously, stimulate growth and change; their absence tends to promote isolationism
and stagnation. Moreover, the educated elites, at least, of landlocked states know they are cut off from the sea, perhaps by a hostile
neighbor, and may experience feelings of deprivation, resentment,
even claustrophobia. These feelings can and do have an impact on
both internal development policies and foreign relations.
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REDUCING THE HANDICAPS OF LAND-LOCKEDNESS

The land-locked States of Europe no longer suffer these handicaps, partly because of more favorable political, economic and geographic factors, and partly because the problems have been slowly
and sometimes painfully resolved during the past few centuries.
Those in Africa, Asia and South America, however, must deal with
them as they can. They are currently, it seems, simultaneously pursuing six overlapping and interrelated approaches:
(a) Internationallaw
(b) Bilateral negotiations
(c) Internal development, especially transport
(d) Improved transit facilities and alternate routes
(e) Regional integration and cooperation
(f) United Nations organs and specialized agencies
A brief explanation of each of these might be helpful.
(a)

International Law

Gradually in early modem Europe, insistence on absolute territorial sovereignty, which had led to the imposition of tolls and restrictions on transit traffic, began to give way to a recognition of the
advantages of a free flow of trade. During the nineteenth century
principles of free transit became established to aid commerce and
industry for the benefit of transit and land-locked states alike.
The League of Nations sponsored a series of conferences during
the 1920's which produced both bilateral and multilateral treaties
aimed at the facilitation of free transit. Of these, the most important
were the Barcelona Convention and Statute on Freedon of Transit of
1921, and the Convention and Statute on the International Regime
of Maritime Ports, signed at Geneva in 1923. Together they set minimum standards for the transit and other rights of all states, including those lacking coasts.
After World War II several important events and trends conjoined to improve access to the sea for land-locked states. For one
thing, a relatively new concept emerged, that access to the sea is essential for the expansion of international trade and economic development. The achievement of independence by many former
colonies in Asia and Africa stimulated increasing emphasis on this
relationship, rather than on the traditional stress on "rights" and
"duties" of states. Among the leaders in this renewed battle for a
"free and secure access to the sea" (to borrow Woodrow Wilson's
phrase referring to Poland and Serbia) and Afghanistan and Bolivia.
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The first noteworthy fruit of their efforts was Article 3 of the Convention on the High Seas adopted by the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958.
This represented progress, but was clearly not adequate, so pressure increased for a more definitive solution to the problem. As a
result, the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) adopted eight principles on access to the sea and
several recommendations, one of which led to the United Nations
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, signed at New
York in July 1965. This was the first multilateral treaty to deal specifically with the problem but, while it certainly gave a measure of
"status" to it, it did not offer a solution. Its effectiveness is limited,
moreover, by the fact that only a few transit states have ratified or
acceded to it and only one of these (Nigeria) provides transit for a
developing land-locked country.
The battle was continued on a broader front in the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
1973-1982. Here the land-locked countries joined forces with some
so-called geographically disadvantaged states to form a group of 54
members within the Conference. They worked both for improved
transit provisions in the evolving Convention on the Law of the Sea
and for assurance of access to and benefits from the resources of the
sea. They certainly did not make gains at UNCLOS III proportionate either to their needs or their efforts, but at least the transit provisions (Part X) of the Convention represent a slight net gain over the
1965 New York Convention.
International law, as it has developed so far, can provide a
framework or background for the development of more specific rules
and norms by land-locked and transit states and it can serve as a
datum plane, a standard against which actual state practice in transit
matters can be measured. It has not yet, however, assured landlocked countries of a guaranteed right of transit and is not likely to
do so in the foreseeable future.
(b)

Bilateral Negotiations

All multilateral conventions dealing with this subject insist that
the "terms and modalities" (or similar phrasing) of transit arrangements must be negotiated bilaterally (or regionally) by the landlocked and transit countries. In these negotiations, the coastal state
in most cases is larger, richer and more powerful than the interior
state, and it is often difficult for the latter to win what it considers
satisfactory transit arrangements. The coastal state, moreover, fre-
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quently insists on including transit as just one more item in a trade
treaty or in an even broader treaty of friendship. Such treaties are
usually short-term, generally expiring after ten years, sometimes
after five. Transit thus does not get the careful attention it deserves
and can be restricted or even withdrawn upon the expiration of the
agreement.
The land-locked state, then, finds that in order to obtain and
retain the transit necessary for its economic development, it must
remain on good terms with a transit state, regardless of political, social, cultural, military, economic or other disparities between them.
Or it must have something of very great value to offer in exchange
for adequate and assured transit, or it must bargain with consummate skill. These are very great burdens to place on a country which
is very likely small, poor and weak. Nevertheless, because transit
states do have something to gain from a relatively free flow of commerce, and because they are generally interested in maintaining
world public order, transit trade ofland-locked countries does move,
however imperfectly, across the sovereign territory of coastal states
under terms of bilateral agreements. But in nearly all cases these
agreements can be greatly improved.
(c) Internal Development, Especially Transport
In all developing countries improvement of transport infrastructure and equipment has high priority. For the developing landlocked countries, in general, transport is essential for all the usual
reasons and, in addition, for its value in reducing their isolation from
the rest of the world. There is, furthermore, little to be gained from
even ideal transit arrangements with coastal states if goods cannot
move quickly and safely to and from the border within the interior
state.
In addition to the basic road, rail and water transport facilities,
the developing land-locked countries are working to improve cargohandling and storage facilities, telecommunications, and the organization and administration of internal freight movement. Even where
international trade is essential for basic economic health, procedures
for clearing and forwarding may be antiquated and inhibiting and
are being improved in many places. Air transport is important in
most developing countries, including those without littorals, but
rarely carries a high proportion of the freight moving either internally or in foreign commerce.

6
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Improved Transit Facilities and Alternate Routes

With the exceptions of the USSR and South Africa, all countries which provide transit for developing land-locked states are
themselves poor and some, indeed, rank among the least developed.
Their transport systems are often overburdened with their own traffic and transit traffic is an unwelcome additional burden. Seaports
are congested, procedures impede rather than expedite movement,
and traffic is interrupted by strikes and civil disturbances as well as
by uncontrollable natural forces.
Land-locked countries are trying to resolve these problems by a
variety of methods. In some cases, particularly as in parts of Africa
where transit traffic provides a large share of the revenues of the
transport systems of coastal states, they actually participate in the
ownership and/or operation of the transport facilities. Elsewhere,
they contribute to the improvement of these facilities, maintaining
free zones in ports and transshipment points and, perhaps more important, trying to develop alternate transit routes, both within a single transit state and through several coastal counties.
Dependence on a single seaport and/or a single transport line
renders a land-locked state vulnerable to interruption of transit,
while alternate routes and ports spread both the risks and benefits
while stimulating development in difference parts of both the landlocked and transit countries. Economic benefits and costs, however,
vary greatly from place to place and even from time to time and
must be carefully calculated.
(e) Regional Integration and Cooperation
Indisputably, the only way to eliminate completely the transit
problems of land-locked states is to eliminate all international
boundaries between them and the sea; that is, political integration
with coastal states. This has not happened in recent times, however,
and is unlikely to happen anywhere very soon. The next best way to
resolve transit problems is through regional economic integration.
This has been accomplished in varying degrees in East, West and
South-Central Africa, and in South America. The best example of
economic integration facilitating transit for a land-locked country
was the East African Community until its demise in the mid-1970s.
Even in this case, however, Uganda and non-member Rwanda experienced interruption of their transit traffic.
Various kinds and levels of economic cooperation not involving
integration have also resulted in better transit for land-locked coun-
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tries. The Asian Highway and the Latin American Railroad Association are examples of such cooperation. Some observers are
postulating now that regionalism is, in fact, the most feasible and
even the most desirable approach not only to transit problems but
also to the use of the sea and exploitation of its resources by landlocked countries. That remains to be seen, but the benefits of regional cooperation in transit matters, even without integration, are
already quite apparent, particularly in West Africa.
(f)

United National Organs and Specialized Agencies

For more than a quarter of a century the United Nations has
been increasingly active in taking and encouraging "special measures related to the particular needs of the land-locked developing
countries," as the UN phrases it. UNCTAD has produced a number
of valuable studies and recommendations concerning both transit facilities and procedures, and has provided technical assistance to a
number of countries. It has a unit specializing in landlocked and
certain other developing countries. The United Nations Development Programme has a special project to provide "Assistance to the
Least Developed Land-locked Countries." It began operating in
South Asia in 1975 and has more recently been extended to East,
West and Southern Africa. The World Bank and the regional development banks have invested heavily in transport infrastructure.
The regional economic commissions have been especially active
in different ways in helping the land-locked countries in their regions. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), for example, sponsors an intergovernmental Special Body on Land-locked Countries, organized in 1972;
the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has sponsored numerous meetings of transit and customs experts to recommend improvements in these areas; and UN Economic Commission for Latin
America (CEPAL) has developed an Integrated Transit System for
Bolivian goods in transit through the Chilean ports of Africa and
Antofagasta.
In December 1976 the General Assembly established the United
Nations Special Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries. It
acts as an organ of the GA in collecting and disbursing voluntary
contributions "in order to compensate the land-locked countries for
their additional transport costs." To date the fund has been very
small, but it has been able to finance the acquisition or construction
of key bottleneck-breaking facilities and equipment for several countries in Africa and Asia. Finally, assistance to developing land-
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locked countries is perenially on the agenda of the General Assembly; undoubtedly new initiatives to relieve their plight will be forthcoming in years to come.
Despite all of this activity by and on behalf of the World's landlocked countries, the fact remains that most of them remain small,
poor and weak. The following case studies of Afghanistan, Nepal
and Laos illustrate the complexities of their problems. They were
chosen because of the five land-locked countries in Asia, they are the
three with the greatest volume of transit trade (i.e., trade with countries other than their immediate neighbors), they are the only ones
which participate actively in regional and sub-regional transport and
related projects, and they are the ones for which most information is
available. Mongolia and Bhutan are not only utterly rependent
upon the Soviet Union and India respectively for transit, but are also
economic and to a large extent political dependencies of their transit
states. Thus they tend to be atypical and both Asian states and landlocked states. 1
3. AFGHANISTAN 2
Afghanistan is a mountain country, straddling the mighty
Hindu Kush, a range rising to more than 24,000 feet radiating westward for more than 700 miles from the great Pamir Knot of Central
Asia. To the north and south of the Hindu Kush are lower parallel
ranges and still further to the north and south, lowlands. Even
within the lowlands, however, are other mountain ranges rising to
I. Much of the material in these case studies is drawn from the author's experience
as advisor to His Majesty's Government of Nepal on negotiations with India for a new
transit treaty in 1976 and as consultant to the United Nations Development Programme
on Project RAS/72/077, which involved visiting Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos in 1979
and recommending improvements in this project to aid the least-developed land-locked
countries of Asia. Much additional material is drawn from United Nations reports.
These are the principal sources of unattributed statistics and statements in the text
which follows. In addition to these sources and those cited in these notes, many more
may be useful to persons seeking additional information on the subject. The most complete guide extant is Martin Ira Glassner, Bibliography on Land-locked States, Alphen
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980.
2. The present tense, as used in these three case studies, must be understood to
mean the period 1978-1982 without taking into account major events, such as the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, which may have altered the situation.
Generally speaking, less information is available for all three countries for more recent
years than for the early part of this period. For a detailed case study of Afghanistan's
transit problems, see Martin Ira Glassner, Access to the Sea for /)eve/oping Land-locked
States, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Much of the older material in this section
comes from this study.
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15,000 feet, bringing the mountainous area of the country to more
than two-thirds of the total. While the plains and mountain valleys
contain most of the economic activity of the country, the mountains
dominate its history, geography and psychology.
The country is drained by many rivers and smaller streams, but
only four are considered major ones. The most important, and the
only one that is navigable, is the Amu Darya, known historically as
the Oxus. This river rises high in the Pamirs, flows westward
through northeastern Afghanistan and along the Soviet border, then
northward through the Kara Kum Desert, eventually to empty into
the Aral Sea. Below Bakhorak the Amu Darya is broad and meandering with many islands. The left, or Afghan, bank is low and subject to flooding; the right, or Soviet, bank is firmer and all of the
sizable river towns are on the Soviet side.
The climate of Afghanistan may be described as generally dry
but variable, since elevation and exposure, as well as the seasons,
produce a wide variety of climates. The north is generally colder
and drier than the south, the border area being, except in the eastern
mountains, a true desert. In the south, from Kandahar westward
well into Iran, is the Registan Desert, where temperatures sometimes
go well over 100°F. For the most part, however, the country is
cooler and, of course, quite cold in the mountains, Kabul, the capiutal, is in the better-watered eastern portion of the country, but because of its altitude (about 6,000 feet) still receives only 13.3 inches
of precipitation per year.
Despite some rudimentary industrialization and some mining,
mostly of coal, iron ore and natural gas, Afghanistan is still an agricultural country. Some three-quarters of the national income is derived from agriculture and only after usually poor harvests is it
necessary to import food. The principal crops are wheat, cotton,
sugar beets and cane, fruits and nuts. Livestock are also important,
with chickens, camels and cattle raised in much of the country. By
far the most important livestock, however, are the Karakul sheep,
which produce both wool and from one to three million skins ("Persian lamb") a year for export.
Foreign trade has been growing in importance, particularly
since 1954, when economic development programs began. Karakul
has long been the most important export, but exports of fruits and
nuts - fresh, dried and preserved - have geen growing rapidly.
Cotton, carpets and rugs, oil seeds, wool, hides and skins and sausage casings are all important traditional exports. Recently, the Soviet Union has been importing significant and growing quantities of
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natural gas from Afghanistan and is expected to develop the rich
Haji-gak iron ore deposits in the eastern mountains for her own supplies. Afghanistan's best customers, in order, are the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, India, West Germany and Japan.
Imports, as might be expected, consist of a wide variety of capital and consumer goods and petroleum products, by far the most
important import.. The USSR supplies nearly all of Afghanistan's
petroleum and sugar imports, while other important suppliers are
India, Pakistan, Japan, West Germany. Czechoslovakia and the
United States. To the commercial imports, however, must be added
the inflow of aid goods.
(a) Afghan Transit Routes and Facilities
Afghanistan for millenia has been a crossroads of history, with
traders, migrants and soldiers passing through in every direction and often settling down to form part of the variegated population.
The ancient Silk Road and Spice Road crossed the country and have
recently been revived with modern technology. Not until the partition oflndia in 1947, however, had there been any problems with the
flow of goods from, to and through the country.
Before the partition of India, relations between the two countries were governed by the Treaty for the Establishment of Neighborly Relations between the Government of Afghanistan and the
British Government, dated 22 November 1921, and the Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention of June 1923. Neither dealt exclusively with
transit, but both emphasized the principle of freedom of transit expressed in the Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit,
adopted at a League of Nations conference in Barcelona in 1921.
The first treaty exempted most Afghan goods entering Indian ports
from customs duties and specified customs clearance procedures.
Routes between the ports and Afghanistan were also agreed upon, as
well as procedures for inspection and sealing of goods in transit.
The second treaty specified the transit routes and administrative procedures in more detail.
When partition was proposed, Afghanistan took the opportunity
to suggest a separate sovereign state for the Pathans (closely related
to the Pushtus of Afghanistan) of the Northwest Frontier Province.
This idea was rejected by the Muslims of India and, after independence, by Pakistan as well. Afghanistan, however, continued to
press for an independent Pushtunistan. Pakistan, in retaliation, began delaying Afghan transit traffic in various ways. Some goods
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were damaged enroute to Afghanistan; some never arrived at all.
The situation deteriorated as the Kashmir dispute intensified and by
December 1949 Afghan transit traffic through Karachi had virtually
halted.
In reaction to this and other frustrations, the Afghans in July
1950 signed a four-year barter agreement, the first in its history, with
the Soviet Union. It provided also for Soviet technical assistance to
Afghanistan and free transit for Afghan goods through the USSR.
Trade with the Soviet Union mushroomed from 1950 to 1955, while
Afghan transit trade through Karachi also increased. By 1955 80
percent of Afghanistan's exports and 79 percent of her imports
passed through Pakistan. In 1955, however, there were more riots
over Pushtunistan and Pakistan again closed the border, this time for
five months.
The Afghans reacted by beginning a search for a transit route
through Iran and by asking the Soviets for a renewal of the 1950
transit agreement. The renewal, dated 28 June 1955, also provided
for Soviet transit through Afghanistan and a massive increase in Soviet aid to the country.
Relations with Pakistan also improved (under American pressure) and on May 29, 1958 Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a transit
agreement which provided for improved facilities for Afghan goods.
This new display of good will, however, did not endure, for in August 1961 another dispute broke out between the two neighbors
which again resulted in their common border being closed, this time
until July 1963. During this period the Afghans signed a new agreement with the Soviets increasing Afghan transit facilities in the
USSR (November 1961), and a first agreement with Iran granting
Afghanistan some transit facilities in that country (January 1962).
While the latter agreement does not appear to have been implemented, the former resulted in the diversion of all Afghan overland
trade (except for U.S. aid goods) through the USSR.
Finally, on May 28, 1963, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an
agreement in Tehran re-establishing diplomatic relations and reopening the border. Trade and transit were to be resumed under
terms of the 1958 agreement. Thereafter, relations with Pakistan improved while Afghanistan's economic development accelerated. The
bulk of Afghan transit traffic had shifted, however, probably permanently, to the Soviet routes. In 1975, 70 percent went this way, while
only about 20 percent passed through Pakistan, and in that year Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed another transit agreement.
While the Pushtunistan issue involves primarily Afghanistan
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and Pakistan, Iran is concerned with it also, especially when, as after
the overthrow of Afghan monarchy in July 1973, the Afghan proposal includes part of Baluchistan as well. In order to calm the tension
between them, Iran and Afghanistan sent official delegations to one
another in 1974. They reached agreements on Iranian aid to Afghanistan, extension of the Iranian railroad network to Herat, Kandahar and Kabul and, in September 1974, a new five-year transit
agreement. There were also discussions, as there had been in years
past, of new road and rail routes between Afghanistan and Iranian
ports, specifically Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar, but none of these
proposed facilities has yet been constructed. 3
Afghan transit traffic does, however, flow through Iran. In 1978
the Afghan government, in a joint venture with a Dutch firm, created the Afghan International Transport Company (AITC) to operate trucks between Afghanistan and Europe. The company owns ten
DAF tractor-trailers. They are generally used between Europe and
Afghanistan, but some trips are made to Pakistan and some from
point to point within Europe. They carry mostly carpets, rugs, handicrafts, antiques, dried fruits, seeds and other high-value goods to
Europe and bring back machinery, equipment, spare parts, tires and
tubes, electrical appliances and household goods, vehicles and textiles. The average trip from Kabul to Frankfurt or Milan takes 19
days, to Basle 19 days, to Rotterdam 20, and to London 21. These
trips are made under a variety of bilateral agreements and under the
1959 Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods
under Cover of TIR Carnets, but are handicapped by limitations on
various insurance and customs payment systems. 4
The chaotic situation in Iran since 1979, including revolution
and the war with Iraq, has restricted Afghan transit somewhat and
increased costs considerably, especially in extortions all along the
route (a problem even more serious in Turkey). The same is true for
the incipient Afghan overland trade with the Arab countries along
the Persian Gulf. 5
3. For details on Afghan-Iranian relations, see Burrell, Robert M. and Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan: Tensions and .Dilemmas. Beverly Hills and London:
Sage Publications, 1974 and Foot, Rosemary, "The Changing Pattern of Afghanistan's
Relations with its Neighbors." Asian Affairs, Volume II, No. I, February 1980, pp. 5562.
4. For more information on the formation and early operations of AITC, see the
excellent article by John S. Gallagher, "Improving Transport to Expand Exports," International Trade Forum, Vol. 15, No.2, April-June 1979, pp. 18-22. This article also contains valuable material on other aspects of Afghan transit problems.
5. Afghanistan has high hopes for expanded trade with the Gulf States, and the
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Of Afghanistan's four neighbors, China alone offers no feasible
overland transit route to and from the sea. Their common boundary
at the eastern extremity of the Wakhan Corridor runs through about
fifty miles of exceedingly difficult country. The corridor itself is useless as a transit route. It has only primitive roads which are impassible for any wheeled vehicles in winter, and besides, it leads nowhere.
Not for some time, if ever, is China likely to provide useful overland
transit to Afghanistan.
After the partition of India in 1947, both India and Pakistan
continued the practice derived from the Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention of collecting customs duties on Afghan goods in transit and
subjecting them to routine bureaucratic procedures, refunding the
duties on goods transported over the established routes. This device,
used to protect against diversion of both inbound and outbond
goods, meant not only delays in the transit of goods, but delays of
three to six months in the refunds of the duties. This situation was
obviously inappropriate for Arghanistan, and in 1952 India and Afghanistan signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce which in
Article 15 provided transit facilities for Afghanistan. These facilities
have been detailed and revised in a number of subsequent
agreements.
Transit across India is not very important, however. Far more
important is Indo-Afghan trade, which involves transit across Pakistan, whether by road, rail or air. Since partition the railroad connecting Peshawar and the Afghan border with the Indian rail
network at Amritsar has been used only intermittently because of
political differences between India and Pakistan. Usually, though,
the Afghans prefer to ship by truck since highway transport between
Kabul and Amritsar takes only one-third as long as rail transport
between Landi Khana and Amritsar and trucks on the Afghan portion. Goods do not have to be transshipped or inspected enroute.
The trucks are sealed in Afghanistan or India and only the seals are
inspected in Pakistan. The most important highway used in Afghan
transit across Pakistan to and from India is the old Grand Trunk
Road which runs from Peshawar through Lahore and Delhi to Calcutta. The routes across Pakistan, however, are used for seasonal
fruit traffic only; all other Indian traffic goes through Karachi and
any Afghan goods in transit through India use the port of Bombay.
UN, through its special project for the least developed land-locked States of Asis, is assisting these efforts. So far, however, the trade is very small, mostly in Afghan exports of
carpets and rugs to Saudi Arabia, nuts to Kuwait, and a little fresh fruit to several countries. Most of this trade will probably have to use air transport.

14

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

While only about 20 percent of Afghan third party trade passed
through Karachi in 1975, this digure may be misleading on two
counts. First, most of Afghanistan's high bulk-low value imports use
the Pakistan transit route, especially those from the Americas and
Asia; and second, the volume appears to have risen considerably
since 1975, though accurate statistics are lacking. Some exports go
out through Karachi also, but not much and no statistics are available. Afghan transit trade, moreover, is not very important to the
port of Karachi, amounting to about 1-2 percent of its total volume.
Pakistan Railways carries the bulk of Afghan intransit goods
between Karachi and the railheads near the Afghan border, Chaman
and Peshawar. There is a railroad between Peshawar and Landi
Khana near the Khyber Pass, but because of the terrain and its poor
condition it is little used. Goods are generally carried by truck between Peshawar and Afghanistan. The route from Jacobabad to
Quetta to Chaman has excess capacity but it faces the same topographic problems as the Peshawar-Landi Khana route and unless
extended through southern Afghanistan to Iran - as has been proposed- is unlikely to carry much more traffic than it does now.
The Pakistani road system needs considerable improvement and the
government severely restricts transit traffic by road, so the KarachiPeshawar rail route remains Afghanistan's primary highway through
Pakistan.
Most Afghan transit trade, especially exports, now moves over
the Soviet rail system from three "ports" on the Soviet-Afghan border. This transit traffic in 1978 amounted to 26.5 percent of all goods
crossing the border, the rest being trade between the two countries. 6
The Soviet company Sojuzvneshtrans handles all transit to and from
the border ports and accepts Afghan imports at European ports and
at Soviet ports and railroad stations. Afghan exports through the
Soviet Union consist largely of carpets, hides and skins, wool, furs,
oil seeds and nuts. Imports include equipment, farm machinery,
rolled steel, paper and cardboard.
Generally speaking, the Soviet transit route is efficient and flexible, though delays are often encountered because of shortages of
6. Garin, S. ''Transit Route via USSR," in UNCTAD; ESCAP and Ministry of
Commerce, Seminar on Special Problems of Shipping and Receiving Goods in Afghanistan.
Kabul, June 1979. All the material on routes within the USSR comes from this source
and from Kramarov, E. "Problems in the Transit Trade of Land-locked Developing
Countries," Foreign Trade (Moscow) No.3, 1971, p. 50. Another useful article is
Zhinkin, V., ''Transit Traffic Across Soviet Territory, Foreign Trade No.I, 1972, pp. 4849.
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railway wagons, overloaded ports and other problems. And it is not
cheap, nor is the system yet geared to the extensive use of containers,
only about 4,000 being used in 1978. Soviet ports and stations used
fro Afghan trade with third parties depend on the origins and destinations of the goods. Generally, Odessa is used for trade with Marseilles; Zhdanov and Kerch for Italian ports; Leningrad for Britain
and North America; Talinn for Scandinavia; Klaipeda for West Germany; Chop for Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Austria and Western Europe; Brest for Poland, East Germany and Western Europe; Znjajka
for Finland and Sweden; and Ungeny for Romania. Other ports and
stations used are Riga, Ventspils, Kaliningrad and Viborg on the
Baltic; Iljichevsk and Novorosisk on the Black Sea; Nak.hoda, Vladivostok and Vostochni on the Pacific; and Termez and Kushka on the
Afghan border.
The three transshipment points for Afghan goods transiting the
Soviet Union are the Amu Darya ports of Sherk.han Bandar and
Hairatan Bandar opposite Termez and the "dry port" of Torghundi,
five kilometers from the Soviet town of Kushka. Hairatan handles
somewhat more traffic than Sherk.han and nearly double the tonnage
of Torghundi, the newest of the northern ports, established in 1973.7
Hairatan replaces the old port of Tashgozer, whose port was
abandoned because of the unstable river bank. Hairatan is about 80
km. from Mazar-i-Sharif and 217 km. from Kabul. Eventually,
however, it will be able to serve the southern provinces after a paved
road to Herat is constructed. Goods are barged across the river to
and from Termez, 12 km. away. A combination highway-railroad
bridge connecting the ports was proposed many years ago and was in
the planning stage before the Soviet invasion. Apparently the
Soviets finally built it - primarily for their own use. Hairatan has
quite inadequate transit facilities; nevertheless its traffic continues to
grow as indicated by the representative figures below.
Traffic Through Hairatan Bandar (tons)
1973-74
1974-75
1977-78

Imports
57,702
61,342
100,555

Exports
56,523
61,093
72,540

Total
116,225
122,435
173,095

7. Until 1978 all statistics relating to Afghanistan's foreign trade were conjectural.
One of the major accomplishments of Project RAS/72/077 was to establish an information monitoring system at the three northern ports so that more recent figures represent
reasonably accurate estimates.
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Sherkhan Bandar, about 65 km. north of Kunduz and 404 km.
from Kabul, has less favorable site than Hairatan because of great
seasonal fluctuations in the water level. The riverbank has been
paved, however, and barges can tie up alongside so goods can be
transferred directly to and from trucks. It has five covered warehouses compared with two in Hairatan and both ports have sizable
open - and unpaved - space for storage. Tugs tow open steel
barges between Sherkhan a~d Termez, a distance of about 180 km.,
in about three to four days, depending on the current. The Soviets
are responsible for the maintenance of the river- dredging, marking, lighting etc. The post serves Kabul and occasionally such distant places as Kandahar and Jalalabad.
Traffic Through Sherkhan Bandar (tons)
Total
Imports
Exports
111,770
1972-73
65,441
46,329
89,931
41,472
1974-75
48,359
123,549
43,565
1977-78
79,983
Torghundi is connected to Herat by 113 km. of good highway.
It is 681 km. from Kandahar and 1165 km. from Kabul. Through
Mazar it serves the northern provinces effectively. The Soviet railway enters Afghanistan in one line and then branches out near
Torghundi into sidings and shunting facilities. The Soviets are responsible for all railroad equipment and maintenance, rail movements and everything else connected with the railroad. The port has
two covered and two open warehouses and ample open space. Like
the other two ports, it has inadequate facilities and equipment, but
unlike the others it has adequate manpower. Traffic through the
port is erratic, but is gradually building up. Samp~e figures follow:
Traffic Flow through Torghundi (tons)
Total
Imports
Exports
70,156
1974-75
47,692
22,464
98,781
1977-78
73,059
25,722
Interestingly, Torghundi is also a transshipment point for Pakistani transit traffic. This is handled by the Soviet company Afsotr. In
1977-78 this traffic amounted to 189 containers of imports and 2215
tons of exports.
Air transport, both domestic and international, is increasingly
important to Afghanistan. It began in 1944, when the first office of
civil air services was established and the first foreign planes began
serving the country regularly, though there had been occasional
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flights from the Soviet Union since 1927 and from Germany since
1937. Ariana Afghan Airlines, organized in January 1955, was reorganized in 1957, with 51 percent of it owned by the government and
49 percent by Pan American World Airlines, which managed it. In
January 1971 Bakhtar Airlines took over its internal routes. Though
still very modest, the growth of Mghan air transport is indicated by
the figures for total international cargo loaded and unloaded at
Kabul, in metric tons: 1969- 3,382; 1974-5,100, compared with
the 1978-79 total for Ariana alone of 5,161 metric tons. 8
The number of foreign cities served, the distances flown and the
frequency of flights have all increased significantly since 1974, as
well as the volume and variety of goods carried. During the summer
of 1979, according to Hamid, Ariana offered five flights a week to
western Europe, two to the Soviet Union and four to India, of which
two were all freight. The cargoes are essentially the same high
value-low bulk goods recently being carried increasingly by truck:
Karakul, carpets, dried fruits, electronics, spare parts, textiles, tea,
spices, etc.
(b)

Afghan Transit Problems

In 1967 and again in 1971 a French expert serving with the Afghan Ministry of Commerce did studies of the Mghan transit system. In 1971 he recommended the creation of a government body to
handle all transit traffic, more rail transport and more use of containers, railroads from Chaman in Pakistan to Spin Boldak inside Mghanistan and across Iran to connect Mghanistan with Western
Europe, a railroad bridge across the Amu Darya at Termez, a highway along the Helmand River and thence to Bandar Abbas in Iran
where Afghanistan should have a free port, and a customs-free warehouse in Karachi. 9 In the decade since then, some progress has been
made, notably in the establishment of the AITC and the production
of a large number of important studies by the UN project of assistance to the least developed land-locked countries of Asia, but the
basic problems described in detail by Jacquemond, Ackermann,
Thomas and other foreign experts remain.
8. The earlier figures are from Amid, Hamidullah and Gordon B. Schilz, A Geography of Afghanistan, Omaha: Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at
Omaha, 1976, p. 144. The latest one is from A.A. Hamid's paper "Role of Air Transport
in Afghanistan" read at the Kabul seminar cited in note 6.
9. Jacquemond, J.B. "Etude de Mesures propres a ameliorer les transports pour le
commerce exterieur et assurer le desenclavement de 1' Afghanistan," Kabul: Afghanistan, Ministry of Commerce, June 30, 1971.
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Rail, road and port facilities in Iran are still inadequate to handle significant volumes of Afghan transit traffic efficiently and economically, there are too many people taking bribes to smooth the
way through the country and the whole situation is exacerbated by
civil commotion and the war with Iraq, conditions over which Afghanistan has no influence whatever. Afghan trucks are still notallowed to cross Pakistan into India, which means goods must be
transshipped at least twice during a relatively short journey, and
overland trade is essentially limited to fresh fruits exported from Afghanistan. Even the Soviet transit route, and best of all, has
problems with sporadic shortages of wagons and delays in payments
to Afghan exporters. The major difficulties, however, are still with
the Pakistan transit route.
In the port of Karachi, Afghan goods are piled in the open with
no security and no protection from the elements. They are moved
about from place to place at the discretion of the port authorities,
suffering damage with each move, and the Karachi Port Trust does
not pay for lost or damaged goods. Railway wagons are chronically
insufficient and Afghan goods incur high wharfage and demurrage
charges waiting for them. Pakistan offered space for an Afghan
warehouse, but it was distant from the water and outside the security
area, so the Afghans rejected it. Clearing and forwarding are very
complex procedures. Many documents, steps and signatures are necessary. One small mistake in a document can hold up a shipment for
a month or longer. Imported goods frequently disappear from
sealed wagons before they arrive at Chaman or Peshawar. Similar
problems are found in these transshipment points and in addition
there is the problem of obtaining trucks, whose availability fluctuates
seasonally, for onward shipment to Afghanistan.
Exports suffer in the same way and in addition, they often arrive
at the Karachi port after the ship on which they were booked has
sailed and have to be stored until the arrival of another ship bound
for their destination. Not only does this add to the monetary cost of
the goods in their eventual market, but the cost in terms of reputation for reliable delivery is incalculable.
All of these delays, damages and disappearances increase considerably the cost of insurance, which has to be paid by the ultimate
purchaser of the goods, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Even
air freight has problems, including lack of operating permission into
many countries, high cost of fuel, storage of Kabul airport which has
been described as "a nightmare for the airline community," cumbersome formalities and competition from trucks. especially when some
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goods best sent overland are sent by air, creating backlogs for legitimate air cargoes.
Some progress is being made in resolving some of these
problems. The UN project discussed earlier has made many valuable studies which can aid in planning improvements in transit facilities and procedures. It has helped Afghanistan negotiate favorable
transit agreements with Bulgaria and Switzerland and was slated to
do the same with other European countries. It has identified the
needs for and helped channel $70,000 from the United Nations Special Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries to Torghundi for
desperately needed equipment. It has established a Transit Traffic
Information Monitoring System in Chaman, Pewhawar and Karachi. It has made recommendations which, if implemented, could relieve Afghanistan's transit plight. But few of them are likely to be
implemented without Pakistan's cooperation, which is unlikely to be
forthcoming very soon for several reasons.
Pakistan insists that transit is strictly a bilateral matter, to be
worked out between the land-locked state and the transit state, with
no participation by any third party, including the United Nations.
Pakistan is also wary of dealings with Afghanistan because of the
Pushtunistan issue and the real possibility of her own dismemberment. Finally, Pakistan is herself a poor country and really cannot
afford to provide all of the facilities and equipment necessary to improve Afghanistan's transit situation dramatically. A large measure
of mutual good will and cooperation will be necessary to accomplish
this goal but, considering the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, that
now seems more distant than ever.
4.

NEPAL

Nepal, like Afghanistan, is dominated by mountains, but the
mountains - the Himalayas - lie in the north, along the China
border, rather than in the center as in Afghanistan. The middle zone
in Nepal, where most of the people live, is called "the hills," though
these hills frequently reach nearly 2,800 meters in altitude. The
southernmost belt is called the Terai and is part of the Ganges plain.
The country is drained by many rivers, most of them flowing out of
the Himalayas generally southward and into the Ganges. The entire
country is subject to the monsoon, but climate varies greatly with
altitude. The Terai was once covered with a heavy subtropical forest, interspersed with malarial swamps, but as soon as malaria was
eradicated from the region in the 1950's through American aid, set-
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tlers moved in from the north and south, cleared most of the forests,
and planted rice, jute and other crops.
Nepal is still almost entirely an agricultural country. Some light
industries are located in the northern outskirts of Kathmandu, and
Biratnager, in the Terai near the Indian border, is slated to be the
country's principal industrial center, but total industrial production
is still very small. Despite some extensive geological surveys, to date
no extensive deposits of commercially useful minerals have been
found. Unless some are found and can be conveniently exploited,
Nepal is likely to remain largely agricultural and her vast hydroelectric power resources will be tapped primarily for export.
Foreign trade statistics are usually grouped into three categories, those with India, with Tibet and with overseas, or third countries. Of these the trade with India is overwhelmingly important.
Nepal has traditionally been essentially an economic appendage of
India, and one of her major foreign policy objectives in the last two
decades has been to reduce this dependence and diversify her markets and sources of supply. These efforts have achieved considerable
success. during the 1970's particularly there was a notable drop in
the proportion of Indian trade in Nepal's total foreign trade, from
74.9 percent of her exports and 67.7 percent of her imports in 197576 to only 43.5 percent of exports and 58.1 percent of imports in
1977-78. 10 As overseas trade has become steadily more important to
Nepal, so have her transit arrangements.
Nepal is not only land-locked, she is also, as is frequently noted
by Nepalese, "India-locked." Her only other neighbor, China, has
never been and is not likely to be an important transit state for Nepal because of the Himalayas and the great distance between Nepal
and the Pacific Ocean through China. For a number of years there
have been many proposals for a regular air serivde between Kathmandu and Beijing and Hong Kong, but none has been initiated yet.
So India is the sole provider of transit for Nepal.
Prior to 1950, Nepal had virtually no trade with countries other
than India and, to a small degree, with Tibet. Thus, there was no
need for transit arrangements. Then in July 1950, India and Nepal
signed a Treaty of Trade and Commerce of which Articles 1, 2, and
4 dealt with transit. Article 1 read, "The Government of India rec10. Nepal Overseas Trade Statistics 1977-78. Kathmandu: Trade Promotion Centre,
1978, p. 168. Trade with Tibet, mostly Nepalese rice for Tibetan wool and Chinese consumer goods, remained rather constant during this period at about 2.8 percent of Nepal's
exports and 9.5 percent of imports.
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ognizes in favour of the Government of Nepal full and unrestricted
right of commercial transit of all goods and manufacturers through
the territory and ports of India as provided in Articles 2, 3 and 4
below." At the first glance, this seemed to be a very generous provision, and, indeed, it was insofar as it recognized that Nepal had a
full and unrestricted right of transit through India, but this right was
limited to commercial transit, did not cover persons or baggage, and
was further restricted by the phrasing of Articles 2 and 4.
Though many important aspects of any transit arrangement
were entirely ommitted from the treaty, it might have been adequate
for a while if interpreted and administered liberally by India, but for
Article 5. This article required Nepal to levy both import and export
duties on goods traded with third countries at rates not lower than
those of India for the same goods. In addition, Nepalese exports to
India were required to bear export duties high enough to prevent
their being sold_ in India at prices lower than those of domestic goods
which bore high taxes. Thus, Nepal was prohibited from competing
effectively with Indian products, either within India or Nepal, or in
foreign markets. The growth of Nepalese industry was stifled even
as the overthrow of the century-old autocratic rule by prime ministers of the Rana family opened the country for the first time to economic development and foreign trade. Nepal was thus unable to
take full advantage of even the limited transit rights granted by the
1950 treaty.
The next decade saw many changes in Nepal, India, and the
legal status of land-locked states in the world. By 1960, it was clear
to both countries that the 1950 treaty was inadequate and a new,
more elaborate, treaty was negotiated and signed in September,
1960. The treaty was supplemented by a protocol and memorandum, signed simultaneously with the treaty, which detailed the procedures to be used in moving Nepalese goods in transit through
India.
The 1960 Treaty of Trade and Transit, while to some extent
freeing Nepal's foreign trade from its linkage to India's international
trade policies, was nevertheless based on India's policy at the time of
working toward a common market of the two countries. Transit was
not mentioned at all in the preamble, and only four articles of the
fourteen dealt with transit between Nepal and third countries
through India. These provided for limited freedom of transit
through each other's territory, a definition of ''traffic in transit" limiting it to goods (including baggage), exemption of traffic in transit
from customs duties, and a commitment that "traffic in transit shall
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not be subjected to unnecessary delays or restrictions" if the protocal
was complied with.
One important improvement of the 1960 treaty over the 1950
treaty was that it provided for a special shed in the port of Calcutta
for the termporary storage of Nepalese goods in transit. Another
was that it permitted the stationing of Nepalese Customs Liaison Officers in Calcutta and Barauni, the major trans-shipment point between Indian broad gauge and meter gauge railways. These
advances were, however, wiped out by the requirement that importers and exporters post "a bond with suitable guarantee" that the
goods will not be diverted enroute. While this provision was reciprocal, it applied in practice only to businessmen in Nepal as a device
to prevent Nepalese imports and exports from finding their way into
the Indian market, where many of these products were extremely
costly or prohibited altogether. Requiring the buyer or seller to
gruarantee delivery of goods over which he had no control while in
transit, mostly via Indian Railways, was strange enough, but setting
the bond as high as six hundred percent of the value of the goods
simply made it impossible for many importers to operate. It took
three years of intensive negotiations for Nepal to win abolition of
this bond system.
The memorandum accompanying the 1960 treaty detailed elaborate procedures for handling imports and exports in transit. The
principal weaknesses in these procedures, aside from the bonding
system, were: inspection and sealing of individual packages in a
shipment by customs; Indian use of the Nepalese import and export
licenses as devices to prevent smuggling; and the application of the
same elaborate procedures to goods moving in transit by air as by
land.
During the next several years, a number of modifications were
made in the procedures and facilities to ease some of the difficulties
in moving Nepal's transit traffic. Nepal's transit through India, however, continued to be restricted in various ways in order to aid in the
enforcement of India's restrictive import policy. Indian attitudes toward Nepal, moreover, were also made evident as India graciously
or grudgingly, on various occasions, made concessions to Nepal on
small but important matters.
The 1960 treaty was renewed in 1965 for another five years. Negotiations for a new treaty began in 1970 and dragged on well past
the expiration date of the 1960 treaty, October 31, 1970. They finally
culminated in a new treaty signed on August 13, 1971, to come into
force on the 15th. In the eleven years that had passed between the
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two treaties, conditions had changed even more radically than in the
previous decade.
Nepal's Export Exchange Entitlement Scheme (EEE), introduced in 1961 to stimulate exports of Nepalese goods which could
not compete in price in world markets, was successful to some degree
in increasing exports but had the more important effect of sharply
increasing imports, particularly of luxury goods, some of which
found their way into India. This made free and unrestricted transit
more necessary for Nepal and more of a threat to India. New technologies, acceleration of Nepal's economic development, changing
India-Nelap-China relationships, and Nepal's continuing economic
dependence on India were some of the other factors that contributed
to the protracted negotiations. The result was a treaty that differed
substantially from its predecessors.
The Preamble to the 1971 Treaty of Trade and Transit still
stressed bilateral trade and mentioned transit only in passing.
Article VIII stated, "The Contracting Parties shall accord to
'traffic in transit' freedom of transit across their respective territories
through routes mutually agreed upon." This was a vague enough
commitment but preceded a second paragraph rpoviding, especially
to India, a gigantic loophole: "Each Contracting Party shall have
the right to take all indispensable measures to ensure that such freedom, accorded by it on its territory, does not in any way infringe its
legitimate interests of any kind."
For the first time in a treaty, India, in Article XI, agreed to provide more than one transit facility for Nepal, but only "warehouses
or sheds for the storage of transit cargo awaiting customs clearance
before onward transmission," only "at point or points of entry or
exit" and "subject to relevent laws and regulations prevailing in
India."
Article XII virtually reproduced Article X of the 1960 treaty,
saying that "traffic in transit shall not be subject to avoidable delays
or restrictions" except in case of failure to comply with the procedures laid down in the protocol.
Article XIV denied freedom of transit to goods imported from
one party by the other and re-exported to third countries. It went on
to commit each party to prevent certain kinds of re-exports
altogether.
Article XV, for the first time, granted "merchant ships, sailing
under the flag of Nepal," with certain qualifications, most-favorednation treatment in Indian ports and harbors.
The protocol was much more detailed than that of 1960. It
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specified both the sheds and open space in Calcutta port made available for Nepal's transit cargo and the general terms of the leases for
them. It gave Nepal for the first time authority to own and/or operate trucks and barges in the port area, and, also for the first time,
authorized transit goods to move by road. Another important addition was the establishment of a Joint Review Committee (JRC) to
deal with problems which might arise in implementing the treaty.
Nepal, however, was restricted to using Calcutta as the sole seaport
for her traffic in transit and eleven towns near the Nepal border as
entry and exit points. There was also a number of other restrictions
on the free flow of transit traffic and a long list of procedures
designed to prevent smuggling. 11
Since the 1971 treaty was due to expire in 1976, the Government
of Nepal began preparing to negotiate a new treaty. The Indian position was that the existing treaty was quite satisfactory and should
be renewed with only minor technical changes. Nepal, however, was
very unhappy with it and determined to strive for the best possible
transit and trade arrangements. Negotiations began in the summer
of 1976, just before the expiration of the 1971 treaty. On Nepalese
insistence, this treaty was extended indefinitely while negotiations
continued on and off for nearly two years. Finally, on March 17,
1978, Nepalese patience and negotiating skill paid off as the new
Janata government, which had replaced that of Indira Gandhi,
reached agreement with Nepal.
The 1978 arrangements represent a distinct advance for Nepal
at all three levels, those of principles, facilities and procedures for
traffic in transit. First, Nepal won her point that transit and bilateral
trade are entirely separate matters and should be covered in separate
treaties. In addition, the problem of smuggling, which had long
vexed Nepal-India relations, was covered in a third agreement "to
control unauthorized trade." Transit was further distinguished from
trade by giving the tyransit treaty a duration of seven years with an
optional seven-year renewal, while the other two had dura~ions of
only five years plus a possible renewal for five more years. This was
a very significant concession by India.
The terms of the treaty are virtually identical to the transit provisions of the 1971 treaty, but the accompanying protoool (which
deals with transit facilities) and memorandum (which spells out
11. The foregoing material on Nepal's trade and transit treaties is drawn from
Glassner, Martin Ira, "Transit Rights for Land-locked States and the Special Case of
Nepal," World Affairs, Vol. 140, No.4, Spring 19?8, pp. 307-310.

TRANSIT PROBLEMS

25

transit procedures) are more favorable to Nepal than the documents
they replace. Furthermore, exchange of letters between the parties
which accompany the three main documents provide for Nepalese
transit across the Naxalbari corridor for the first time in order to
permit implementation of the 1976 Nepal-Bangladesh transit treaty
which for the first time offers Nepal transit routes and ports other
than Calcutta. Another exchange of letters agrees to establishment
of an Inter-Governmental Committee "consisting of the senior representatives of the two Governments to promote trade, facilitate
transit and control unauthorised trade between the two countries
..."to meet every six months. While it would have been better to
have two or three separate committees, this is still a better arrangement for resolving differences between the parties than the previous
one.

(a)

Nepal's Transit Routes and Facilities

Of all Indian seaports which could be useful to Nepal in trading
with third countries, India permits her to use only Calcutta. There
she has the use of space in three warehouses, none of which is really
adequate. One, in fact, the only one on the water, had been unsuitable for years because of its poor contition and was recently abandoned. She has also the use of about 4300 square meters of open
space. Recently she was offered space in the new port of Haldia,
some 20 miles down the Hooghly River from Calcutta, but turned it
down because it was far from the water. Nevertheless, Haldia is a
modem port designed to accomodate large ships than Calcutta and
to handle containers and bulk cargo. Some Nepalese cargoes have
used Haldia and its use by Nepal is likely to increase slowing in the
near future. It has one major drawback, however, which at least for
the present makes it less attractive than it might be for Nepal. It is
under the control of the Calcutta Port Trust and therefore subject to
the same inefficiencies, strikes and charges as in Calcutta.
Besides insufficient and deteriorated storage space in Calcutta
port, Nepal traffic in transit suffers long delays because of shortages
of railway wagons, cumbersome procedures involving much
paperwork and many signatures, and very restrictive labor regulations. The only time in memory when Nepalese goods move expeditiously through Calcutta and to and from Nepal was during the
"emergency" declared by Indira Gandhi during the late 1970s. Few
would want that system reinstated, but it did demonstrate how rapidly intransit cargoes can be moved if the transit state is willing.
One of the characteristics of the Indian Railways is that they use
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several different gauges. Generally speaking, the railroads between
Calcutta and the Ganges are broad gauge (5'4"), while north of the
river meter gauge predominates. This means that rail shipments
moving between Nepal and Calcutta must be transshipped, adding
hazards of delay, damage and pilferage enroute as well as at the port
and the border. Indian Railways is currently engaged in a gradual
conversion of the meter-gauge tracks to broad gauge and perhaps by
1990 the tracks must commonly used by Nepalese transit traffic will
be converted. Meanwhile, Barauni is the major transshipment point,
with Gorakhpur and Katihar being other important ones.
Currently the Indian railway system serves 19 points on the Nepal border, of which 13 are approved under the 1978 transit treaty
for Nepal's third country traffic. Two others, Kakarbhitta/Naxalbari in India's sensitive Naxalbari corridor connecting Assam to
the rest of the country, and Pashupatinagar/Sukhiapokhari, continue to be used on an ad hoc basis until the Indian Government
decides whether to make them permanent. Of these points, Jogbani,
near Biratnagar, handles most of Nepal's exports, consisting largely
of agricultural products, primarily jute and jute products, and some
imports, mostly fertilizers, cement and some capital and consumer
goods for local regional markets. Raxaul, opposite the Nepalese
town of Birgunj, handles most of Nepal's imports, especially highvalue goods going to the main population center of the Kathmandu
valley and elsewhere in the country.
Only one rail line is currently in use in Nepal, the narrow gauge
line from Jayanagar in India to Janakpur. 12 There have been numerous proposals to revive the Birgunj-Amelekganj line, abandoned
in 1968, and to extend various Indian lines into Nepal, but so far
none has actually been implemented. 13 Generally, goods are carried
between points in Nepal and the Indian railheads and stations by
Nepalese trucks.
Nepalese trucks are also permitted to carry transit cargoes between Nepal and Calcutta, under conditions spelled out in the proto12. This line was constructed in 1935-38 and most of its rolling stock dates from that
time. It is the only means of transportation in the area and in 1976 reached a level of one
million passengers and about 32,000 tons of freight per year. The line is very badly in
need of rehabilitation.
13. The Nepal Transport Corporation operates a narrow gauge reilway which provides irregular service (two-three times per week) between Raxaul and Birgunj; it does
not service the Nepal customs area along the highway and separate customs inspections
take place at the Birgunj railway station. It is a high-cost, low-volume operation and
may well be abandoned soon.
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col and memorandum attached to the 1978 transit treaty. Nepal also
uses - but does not own - warehouses and other storage facilities
at some of the transshipment points.
Nepal's international air transport is growing impressively, but
most of it is passenger traffic, chiefly tourists. In 1979 air cargo
amounted to only 1 percent of third country trade by volume and
about 15 percent of its value. Exports constituted about 25 percent
of total air cargoes and the proportion was rising. Most imports by
air come from Asia (primarily Japan and Hong Kong), while exports
by air go primarily to Europe and America. Only a very small portion of air cargoes is carried by aircraft of the Royal Nepal Airlines
Corporation. RNAC does not offer regular cargo service and cargo
space is only made available when there is an insufficient passenger
load. Thai International and other foreign airlines carry the bulk of
air cargo.
It seems unlikely that in the near future air transport will become a major factor in Nepal's third country trade, despite the recommendations of many foreign experts. The problems are simply
too great for a very poor country with many other priorities. There
has long been insufficient storage space at Tribhuvan Airport, Kathmandu's air facility. Customs and handling procedures are cumbersome. There is no equipment (lighting, instrumentation, etc.) for
night takeoffs and landings, air cargo rates are very high and Nepal
has insufficient agreements with other countries for landing rights,
interline transfers and so on. As the growing tourist trade stimulates
demand for Nepalese handicrafts, rugs and carpets, spices and other
high-value products, and as growing Nepalese incomes permit the
purchase of imported luxury goods, (in addition, of course, to luxury
goods re-exported to India as part of the traditional "unrecorded
trade"), air transport of freight should become more attractive and
many of the problems listed here should receive higher priorities and
be resolved without great difficulty.
Another possible transit option for Nepal is river transport. A
number of studies over the last twenty years or so have revealed that
river transport within Nepal is infeasible because the larger rivers in
the Terai are very shallow with constantly shifting beds. Transport
on the Ganges, however, is rapidly becoming more practical. Imminent completion of a lock canal around the Farakka Barrage should
permit the Indian government to implement its plans for barge traffic
between Calcutta and Varanasi, with possible extension up the Gandak River. This inland waterway route could be cheaper by as much
as abut 50 percent per ton mile than for railway freight, considering

28

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

potential savings in time, theft and damages. Nepalese trucks could
carry goods between Nepal and various river ports, thus bypassing
the railroads entirely. Under the protocal to the 1978 Treaty of
Transit, Nepal has the right to own and/or operate barges within the
Calcutta Port area; she could negotiate for similar rights on the Ganges. This would enable her, especially in conjunction with LASH
vessels, to transfer cargoes directly from ship to river to truck toNepal and vice versa, thus avoiding most of the problems of Calcutta as
well as of the Indian Railways.
One more transit facility should be mentioned. There is a 42
km. ropeway between Kathmandu and Hetaura over a much more
direct route than the Tribhuvan Rajmarg, the tortuous highway built
by the Indian Army in the 1950s to connect Kathmandu with India
at Birgunj. Each of its carriers has a capacity of 1.21 cubic meters or
544 kilos, and the system was designed to carry nearly 28 metric tons
of goods per hour in each direction for 20 hours per day, 350 days
per year, or about 152,000 tons per year in each direction. Its practical capacity, however, is only about 70,000 tons per year and in
1967-67 it actually averaged only 35,000 tpy. The poor performance
was due to technical problems, insufficient carriers, insufficient traffic
and insufficient storage space in Kathmandu, resulting in erratic use
- sometimes over burdened, sometimes unused. During the late
1970s it was improved considerably and is not functioning better.
Under consideration is its extension south to Amelekgunj or even
Birgunj. Alternatively, the Raxaul-Amelekgunj railway might be refurbished, reopened and extended to Hetaura. In either case, there
would be a direct rail-ropeway link, eliminating the truck haul between them. Some consideration is also being given to constructing
other ropeways elsewhere in Nepal and even between Nepal and
Bangladesh across the Naxalbari corridor.
Various studies over the years have recommended that Nepal's
traffic in transit use other Indian seaports besides Calcutta. There
are good rail connections between Bombay and western Nepal, for
example, and the new port of Paradip south of Calcutta is connected
by broad-gauge lines all the way to the excellent new rail junction of
New Jalpaiguri near the Bangladesh border and an easy truck journey to eastern Nepal. India had steadfastly refused, however, to permit Nepal to use any other seaport and she is confined to Calcutta.
Nepal has therefore turned to Chittagong in Bangladesh as an alternative port.
Bangladesh has been quite cooperative in this matter and in
1976 signed a most favorable transit treaty with Nepal. The treaty
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could not be implemented, however, until India granted permission
for Nepal transit cargoes going to or from Bangladesh to cross Indian territory and use Indian border crossing points. This was effected by a protocol to the Nepal-India Treaty of Transit in March
1978 and a memorandum of understanding between India and Bangladesh in August 1978. Transit shipments actually began in March
1979, crossing the corder between Radhikapur, India and Birol, Bangladesh. At present the best route is via all-meter-gauge railways
between Chittagong and Jogbani, but this route is both long and beset by many problems.
For one thing, the entire transportation system of East Pakistan
was devastated during the war which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, and it has still not recovered. There is a shortage of
railway rolling stock, insufficient bridges over the numerous rivers
and there is a sporadic congestion in Chittagong port. There is,
moreover, no procedure for passing required documents from Bangladesh authorities at Birol to Indian customs in Radhikopur only
six miles away, so that they must go from Birol to Chittagong to
Kathmandu to Biratnagar to Radhikapur, a journey which takes
about a month. Meanwhile, the wagons are detained at Radhikapur
incurring huge demurrage charges. Other procedural impediments
and India's refusal to permit road transit through this security area
between Nepal and Bangladesh add to the delays and costs enroute.
Chittagong port itself is much better for Nepal's traffic in transit
than Calcutta ports, since port charges are lower, handling is more
efficient and customs formalities less cumbersome than at Calcutta.
Nepal currently uses three sheds in Chittagong port, one of them in
poor condition, and the port authorities are constructing a large
warehouse exclusively for Nepalese goods. The distance between
Chittagong and Jogbani, however, is 428 km. longer than from Calcutta to Jogbani, the journey across Bangladesh to Radhikapur takes
7-10 days, and the freight rates are higher than on the Indian Railways. Because of these factors, Chittagong has been little used for
Nepalese exports and primarily for infrequent imports of cememt,
fertilizers, grains and other bulk cargoes. There are a number of
possible alternatives to this all-meter-gauge route between Chittagong and Nepal, including various combinations of broasd-and
meter-gauge railroads, waterways and trucks. The most attractive
alternative is to use the port of Chalna south of Dacca rather than
Chittagong. There are difficulties here, however, because of silting
in the port, inadequate lighting for night navigation and high port
charges. Most important, however, is the lack of roads and railways
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at Chalna. Rail and road connections with Khulna upstream are
planned and when completed Chalna might be an excellent transit
port for Nepal. One other uncertainty remains, however; India has
not yet granted permission for Nepal to use the most feasible border
crossing point, at Haldibari south of Jalpaiguri. As with the Chittagong route, there are other possible routes to and from Chalna, but
they have not yet been studied in detail. No matter which routes
through Bangladesh prove technically and economically feasible,
however, all will require the full cooperation of India, which is not
certain to be forthcoming.
Nepal's Transit Problems
A number of Nepal's problems with air and waterway transit
and with the Bangladesh route have already been discussed, though
a great deal more detail could be added. Here we shall concentrate
on a resume of the problems with the Calcutta-Nepal road and rail
transit and what is being done to resolve them.
First, it should be stated that Nepalese transit through Calcutta
has considerably improved overall during the past half dozen years,
particularly since the entry into force ofthe 1978 transit treaty. Second, some of the problems of inadequate facilities and equipment
stem from India's own economic conditions and are endured by her
own shippers as well as those of Nepal. Third, some of the restrictions and complex documentation and cumbersome procedures insisted upon by India stem from a legitimate desire to reduce
smuggling from Nepal to India of imported goods (as well as rice,
timber, jute and other Nepalese products) across their open border
and to reduce "deflection" of imports before they reach the Nepalese
border. Fourth, as noted earlier, there is a serious imbalance in the
direction of Nepal's imports and exports which makes it difficult and
costly to have sufficient railway wagons where and when they are
needed and to find sufficient return cargoes for both wagons and
trucks. Finally, some of Nepal's transit problems are of her own
making since the government is not yet fully committed to industrialization, export expansion or improved transit and so there are inadequate facilities, cumbersome procedures, and lack of
coordination and planning in transit matters within Nepal.

(b)

SELECTED DATA ON INDIAN RAILWAYS
serving Nepal Border Points
1979
Distance between Station and
Gate~

Nearest
Rly Stn.

Nepal Customs

Calcutta

Routing

Third Country

Class I Railway
Tariff to Calcutta

Ex~orts

Imports

(1978-79)
via

Indian Rupee per ton

1282
1251
1221
1151
1089
985
947
892
717
696
641
641
516
530
543
564

Philibit-Shahjahanpur
Lucknow
Gonda - Barauni
Gonda - Barauni
Gonda - Barauni
Gorakhpur - Barauni
Gorakhpur - Barauni
Gorakhpur - Barauni
Darbhanga - Darauni
Sagauli - Barauni
Darbhanga - Barauni
Darbhanga - Barauni
Katihar
Katihar
Barsoi
Barsoi

231.0
227.7
221.2
214.1
202.8
187.9
180.5
173.0

n.a.

n.a.

166

2,850

1043

345

included
4,368
n.a.
500
1424

in Dhangadi
2135
2248
435
n.a.
198
165
6644
441

142.2

9576

134.3
134.3
113.9
115.3
118.6
121.7

4334
3316**
12067
62770
5920
13931

I.

Kanchanpur

Banbasa

4

Dhangadi

Gauri Phanta •

I

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Rajapur
Nepalgunj
Koilabas
Krishnanagar
Bhairawa

Tikonia
Nepalgunj Road*
Jarwa•
Barhni
Nautanwa•

3'h
l'h
5
'h
8'h

8.

Birgunj

Raxaul

I

Sitamahri
Jayanager•
Forbesgunj
Jog bani
Galgalia
Naxalbari

sooo

km

2.

9. Jaleswar
10. Janak pur
II. Setubhand
12. Biratnagar
13. Bhadrapur
14 Kakarvitta (Mechi)

sooo

km

30
29
48
appr. 200m
4
3

Tons

10229
1396
1886**
3964
30679
2184
5456

73274
367
33

~

~

ztil

~

~

::0
0

=

I'"'

rn

:::
til

7185
29

Source: Data compiled by UNCTAD/ESCAP Team
••Does not include exports via Siraha
*Indicate branch line terminal
Notes:• All stations provide daily service
--*Import/export data represent gateway totals which include truck as well as railway traffic; for imports, conversion to tonnage will be completed at a later date.
*Stations I to 10 are served by North eastern Railway; Stations II to 14 by Northeast Frontier Ry.
*Distance by truck Raxaul - Calcutta is 868 km and the tariff per ton is IC 250
*Distance by truck Biratnagar - Calcutta is 580 km and the tariff per ton is IC 180
*Bullock carts are frequently used for transport between Nepal customs and railway stations when the distance does not exceed 10 km.
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Nepal's third country exports, like those of most developing
countries, consist largely of agricultural products and handicrafts. In
1977-78, over one-third of the value of Nepal's exports came from
raw jute and jute goods, down from over 90 percent in 1971-72, an
indication of some success in attempts to diversity exports. Rice accounted for another fifth, another significant factor since rice exports
only began in 1973-74. Other important exports overseas are hides
and skins, handicrafts, carpets, large cardamom, tumeric, oil cake,
dry ginger, linseed and rice bran cake, in that order. Exports go primarily to Belgium, West Germany, Singapore, France, China, Japan, HongKong, Italy and Poland, in that order. Her imports
consist primarily of manufactured goods, of which the most important by far are textiles and petroleum products. Others are machinery and parts, aircraft and parts, fertilizers, motor vehicles and
motorcycles and their parts and accessories, and a variety of other
products. These come from Japan (about 14 percent), USA, China,
the Soviet Union and Korea, with lesser amounts coming from the
UK, West Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand. 14
All but a small amount of this trade passes through Calcutta,
where the list of problems is long indeed: frequent strikes, inadequate storage facilities, inefficient handling, slow postal services,
cumbersome clearance procedures, difficulties in processing insurance claims, chronic shortages of wagons, limited working hours for
port officials and laborers. Sometimes Calcutta Customs has held up
exports for a long time for no apparent reason or because it challenged the certificates of origin. There are many examples over
many years of Nepalese exports being delayed for so long that the
accumulated demurrage charges exceeded the commercial value of
the products. This has happened recently with tumeric and pulses,
for example. A number of times shipments of jute have been destroyed or severely damaged by fire caused by spontaneous combustion after being stored improperly for a long time.
The excessive number of transshipments of goods moving by
rail is a serious problem. The Indian Railways are still not very efficient and there is serious congestion at the major transshipment
points. Congestion is most serious at Raxaul, where problems of security, Indian goods stored at Nepal siding and irregular arrival of
Nepal-bound goods without advance notice add to the woes of insufficient storage. Barauni, where two-thirds of Nepal's imports (eJrcept
for pol products) are transshipped, is also not very efficient Since
14. Nepal Overseas Trade Statistics 1977-78, pp. 148-165.
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January 1980 some transshipment (from broad gauge to truck) of
Nepalese imports has been effected at Narayanpur Anant yards near
Muzaffapur, relieving some of the congestion at Barauni. Other
problems with rail shipment include excessive customs duty insurance (required policies costing several times the Indian customs duty
in order to assure that the goods actually reach Nepal), difficulty in
retrieving goods at customs warehouses, different working hours for
Indian and Nepalese customs officials at border posts, etc. Within
India there are 25 government and private agencies involved in
Nepalese third country trade and 60 different types of documents
comprising 240 forms in regular and special use. All of this results in
average transit times between Nepal and Calcutta of about two
months.
Truck transport costs 3-4 times more than rail transport within
India, but it would result in a net saving in time and cost to shippers,
especially for valuable goods. India, however, restricts truck haulage
to "sensitive" goods, bulk cargoes, and some aid goods. Even when
permitted, truck transport is subject to many restrictions. The use of
containers is limited, individual packages in trucks must be sealed,
trucks are restricted to certain roads even during bad weather, some
Indian states levy taxes on trucks in transit, and so on. Nevertheless,
it is likely that truck transport will increase if only to reduce the
tremendous cost of transit. It has been estimated that the direct costs
ofland-lockedness amount to 10-15 percent ofNepal's GNP, not including unavoidable costs due to her geographic position, but only
the difference between exisitng and technically possible practices.
The UNDP UNCTAD/ESCAP Project of Assistance to the
Least Developed Land-locked Countries in Asia (RAS/72/077) has
helped to ease some fo Nepal's transit problems in a variety of ways.
It has made many studies and produced most useful reports on various aspects of the transit situation and made recommendations for
improvements. It has held seminars and workshops, prepared the
way for development of routes and ports other than Calcutta and
provided technical assistance in various transit operations. It has
also helped arrange the allocation of funds from the UN Special
Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries for the construction of
a large warehouse in Calcutta port for Nepal's use. With all this
help, however, Nepal must still negotiate with India about virtually
every aspect of her transit.
Nepal faces handicaps other than the lack of an alternate transit
state in negotiating with India for suitable transit arrangements.
Most important of these disadvantages is an overwhelming disparity
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in size, population, level of economic development, military
strength, and governmental organization and experience. Add to
that the fact that though the two countries have almost diametrically
opposite import policies, some eighty-five percent of Nepal's total
trade is with India, and a situation exceedingly difficult for Nepal
becomes apparent.
Trade and transit, however, vital as they are, constitute only a
portion of the complex Indo-Nepal relationship. Strong and ancient
cultural ties bind the two countries together, but different political
and social systems give them distinct personalities. Though
Nepalese generally resent the overpowering Indian influence in their
country on everything from consumer goods and movies to commerce, much of which is controlled by Indian merchants, they still
serve in the Indian army (as "Gurkhas"), go to India for sophisticated medical treatment and higher education, invest surplus capital
in India, and migrate to india for work. The relationship between
the two countries is frequently described as "Love hate" or "big
brother-little brother," but underlying it is a deep-seated Nepalese
desire to remain independent.
It would be difficult indeed to find another land-locked state in
the world with as varied and serious a set of obstacles to "free uninterrupted, and continuous" transit to and from the sea as Nepal, and
yet Nepal does have transit facilities in India. Relations between the
two countries, moreover, are good at present and the transit situation
is improving

5. LAOS
Of the three countries we are surveying here, Laos is poorest,
least populated, least industrialized and most isolated. With an area
of 236,800 sq. km., it is a relatively large country, but about twothirds of the country is mountain and highland terrain (averaging 12,000 meters above sea level), and even in the levelland where cultivation is most intense, the soils are poor and crop yields are low. It
is estimated that 63 percent of the country is covered with forests,
but probably only 30 percent of the forests have commercial value.
The climate is the most extreme in southeast Asia and the driest in
Indochina. Luang Prabang, the old royal capital, receives only 53
inches of rain per year and there is a dry season from December to
February. There was a minor drought in 1976 and an unprecedented drought in 1977, followed by disastrous floods in 1978. During this period there were calamitous food shortages and
international relief efforts provided over 150,000 tons of foodstuffs.
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Even in normal years it is hard to make a living in Laos, and most of
the people live at or near the subsistence level.
There is not, in fact, a single Lao economy. The population of
some 3.5 million people is predominantly rural and widely scattered
with an average population density of only 14 per sq. km. in 1980.
About half the population lives in the plains of the Mekong River
and its tributaries and only15 percent live in urban areas. The larger
towns - Vientiame (the capital), Luang Prabang, Savannakhet,
Pakse and Khammovane - are primarily regional markets, though
they have become administrative centers as well. The Lao People's
Democratic Republic is composed of a number of self-contained, local economic units, usually villages, rather than one national economy with a free flow of goods throughout. This is due in large part
to the rudimentary internal transport system. Since 1975 transport
has had a very high priority in government planning and by late
1982 the road network, especially in the north, was considered adequate, though still badly in need of expansion and upgrading to meet
the needs of a growing economy.
The most important economic activity by far is subsistence agriculture, chiefly wet rice cultivation in the lowlands and maize and
dry rice in the highlands. The formal export economy, however, features tin ore, timber, coffee and water buffalo hides. Despite its present poverty, Laos has very large reserves of potentially exportable
iron ore, potash and gypsum - and very likely other minerals as
well. Again, its poor transportation system and weak infrastructure
inhibit the exploitation of these reserves. The Mekong River would
seem to be a natural superhighway, but in fact it is quite unsuitable
for large-scale transport. During the dry season the water is very low
because of frozen headwaters. At that time river transport is hazardous because of falls, rapids, and shallows. During the wet season
there are very dangerous currents, shifting channels, considerable
floating debris, etc. Before World Warr II it took longer for a river
boat to go from Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) to Luang Prabang
than to go from Saigon to Marseilles by steamship. 15 Since independence in 1954 there have been no scheduled river boats. Instead
Highway 13, paralleling the left bank of the Mekong, carries the
bulk of north-south traffic and since 1956 the principal Lao route to
the sea has been the railroad across Thailand between Nonghai and
Bangkok.
15. Barton, Thomas Frank. "Outlets to the Sea for Land-locked Laos," The Journal
of Geography, Vol. 59, No.5, May 1960, pp. 206-220.
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Laos is not a major trading country. In 1980 the total value of
its imports was $82 million and exports $21.8 million, only 26.4 percent and 7 percent respectively of her GNP. Of this trade, imports
from third countries totaled $61.5 million and exports to third countries $17.4 million. These figures are important because, besides illustrating how small the formal economy actually is, they show that
Laos is less dependent for trade on her immediate neighbors (especially Thailand) then either Nepal or Afghanistan, but relatively
more dependent on transit to and from the sea. 16
Under the French colonial regime, Indochina had common customs, monetary, transit and other arrangements. These were dissolved in 1954 when Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and
Laos became independent states. South Vietnam, however, continued to accord transit facilities in Saigon to Cambodia (now
Kampuchea) and Laos under an unwritten understanding. The
usual transit formalities of bonds, seals and inspection were retained,
but no duties or transit taxes were charged other than a small fee to
cover administrative expenses. A Convention on the Port of Saigon
was signed in Paris on December 29, 1954 which provided special
areas of the port for Lao and Cambodian transit goods, but apparently it was never implemented. Laos also signed transit agreements
on June 2, 1959 with South Vietnam and on October 10, 1959 with
Cambodia, but neither of these was implemented either. It is possible that Laos negotiated these agreements merely in order to enhance her bargaining power with Thailand, with whom she had
signed a transit agreement in 1955. In any case, by 1956 the bulk of
Lao transit traffic had shifted from Saigon to Bangkok. Detailed
Lao-Thai transit agreements were signed on July 22, 1959 and June
1, 1978.
A comparison of these two treaties is instructive. The preambles of both are modest and conservative, making no reference either
to the underlying reason for a transit treaty for a land-locked country, or to the numerous resolutions, principles and conventions
adopted since the 1921 Barcelona Convention which recognize the
need for special assistance for least-developed land-locked countries.
Neither one specifies in sufficient detail all phases of transit trade
operations. The 1978 treaty does not include the 1959 provision that
the Barcelona Convention"shall be subject to the laws and regula16. All Lao statistics must be considered less than completely accurate; these UN
figures are very likely more accurate than most. There is also considerable "informal" or
''unrecorded" trade, chietly the smuggling out of rice, timber, livestock and opium, as
well as informal re-exports of luxury goods.
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tions in force in either country," which would seem to imply greater
conformity to the convention in some matters. Another improvement in the 1978 treaty is that it removes certain bilateral trade issues from the transit provisions, notably those obligating Laos to
take certain actions to prevent smuggling.
The 1978 treaty, however, does not provide for simplification of
customs formalities or harmonization of documentation; it does not
even have a protocol or memorandum which spell out procedures
designed to reduce costs and avoid delays of traffic in transit. Both
treaties, moreover, are at sharp variance with current international
forwarding and transport practices in force for land-locked and
transit countries. Instead, they establish a very restrictive transit regime in which Lao goods must be handled by Thai-designated agencies while providing no guarantees for timely deliveries. Even the
1959 provision for joint customs control of traffic in transit was
dropped in 1978.
Both treaties, especially that of 1978, are oriented toward Lao
third-country imports and not toward Lao exports to third countries.
Rather than expediting the growingly essential Lao export promotion and diversification, they are inhibited by requirements concerning origin, marking, valuation and sanitation. One improvement,
however, is that the Thai government corporation Express Transport
Organization, which has a monopoly on haulage of Lao goods
through Thailand, may no longer set and change tarrif rates freely;
instead this is a matter for bilateral agreement. A number of other
provisions concerning rates and charges, transit routes and facilities
roughly balance out so that overall the 1978 treaty does not represent
a significant improvement in the conditions for Lao transit traffic
through Thailand.
Since the treaty was signed, Thai-Lao negotiations on transit
matters have continued at least through 1978 and early 1979, primarily on technical matters, none of which has resulted in notable benefits for Laos. Now, in addition to imposing safeguards to prevent
smuggling, Thailand imposes various restrictions for "security" reasons. The 1978 treaty, moreover, had only a one-year duration, creating a most unstable situation for Laos. Clearly, the change of
government in Laos in 1975 has increased Thai wariness, if not outright hostility, toward Laos, despite their frequent expressions of fraternal (or paternal) concern. Largely because of these unfavorable
transit arrangements through Thailand, Laos is turning more and
more toward transit through Vietnam.
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(a) Lao Transit Routes and Facilities
Between attainment of independence in 1954 and the change of
government in 1975, Laos had the use of five crossing points into
Thailand: Houeisay to Chiang Khouang in the far north near the
Burmese border, Thanaleng near Vientiane to Nonghai, Thakhek to
Nakhon Phanom, Savannakhet to Mukdahan and Pakse to Phibul
Mangsahan. While all were used for bilateral trade during this period, some 90 percent of Lao transit trade crossed the Mekong at
Thanaleng-Nonghai. In 1957-59, for example, according to Barton,
10 percent of Lao transit traffic went through Pakse and Savannakhet together, and various other combinations of road and river
were little usedY In September 1957 an agreement was signed between Thailand's government company, Express Transport Organization (ETO) and the Railway Express Agency of the United States
providing for shipment of cargoes to any destination in Thailand or
Laos on a through bill of lading. This move alone cut delivery time
between Bangkok and Vientiane from six months to about one week;
combined with infrastructive improvements that made transit
cheaper and safer, it solidified the role of this route as the dominant
one for Laos.
In 1976-77, friction between the new Lao Peoples Democratic
Republic and the traditional monarchy of Thailand "resulted in
Bangkok placing a complete ban on the export of strategic materials
to Laos." This was followed in October 1977 by a Thai ban on petroleum shipments to Laos from the Shell Oil Company in Bangkok,
a ban which was later lifted. This illustrated to Laos the danger of
relying too much on transit across Thailand and Laos began reorienting herself toward Vietnam. (Relations with Kampuchea were
also poor, so a southern route was not feasible.) A road was planned
between Thakhek and Danang and other routes to the east were
considered. 18
During this period, there was also a radical shift in the direction
of Lao imports. In 1976 Thailand was the dominant source of imports; in 1977 Laos imported far less from Thailand, and the Soviet
Union suddenly became the major supplier. At the same time Japan's share of exports to Laos doubled while all other sources to17. For more details of Lao transit in the late 1950's, see Stojkovic, Ivan, "Les
Problemes du Transport et du Transit au Laos," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, May 1962.
18. Hardstone, Peter C.N., "Laos: The Transportation Problems of an Indochinese
Landlocked State," Philippine Geographical Journal, Vol. 22, No.3, July-September 1978,
pp. 151-160.
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gether provided less than 10 percent of Lao imports. The pattern has
since returned to a more normal one, but this shift also illustrates the
volatility of trading patterns due to political conditions. Inevitably,
changing trading patterns mean changing transit patterns for a landlocked country. A more important, long-term change in Lao imports
since economic development really began in 1977 has been from
predominantly pol products and luxury goods to food, industrial raw
materials, machinery and transportation equipment. Thus there is
greater need now for safe, efficient and economical transit. Lao exports have not changed so much, either in volume or composition,
but export earnings are more important than ever because they are
needed now for investment in economic development.
The main Lao transit route remains Nonghai-Bangkok. There
are good road and rail connections between the two termini and both
are heavily used for Lao transit traffic. The Port of Bangkok is a
river port and subject to a draft limitation of 8.2 meters. The port
comrises a mix of State and privately-owned wharves with Klong
Toi, owned and operated by the Port Authority of Thailand, forming
its principal component. Some Lao transit traffic is landed at the
Thai Maritime Company terminal, but Klong Toi is really Laos'
gateway to the world. On the whole the port is efficiently run. Since
traffic volume has grown rapidly, congestion began to be a problem
in the late 1970s, but the port is being expanded to accomodate this
new traffic. In addition, the Thai government is constructing a new
deep-water port at Sattahip (due for completion in 1985) and plans
another at Laem Chabang, 70 km. south of Bangkok, scheduled to
go into operation in the early 1990s. In future, Laem Chabang might
become the principal Lao transit port.
The Port Authority of Thailand has provided Laos with a new,
efficient intransit warehouse in Klong Toi. It would be more useful
if it were on the water and it is now occasionally too small to accommodate all the goods in transit at a particular time, but the Thais
seem willing to assist in such improvements as might be necessary.
Thai trucks ply directly between this warehouse and the ferry at
Nonghai, cross the Mekong on the ferry and unload their cargoes in
the Lao port of Thanaleng, whence they are transported to their ultimate destination by Lao trucks. Exports move in the reverse direction. When the railroad is used, trucks must still carry the cargoes
between the trains and the transit warehouses in Bangkok and
Nonghai. Generally speaking, Laos has few transit problems in
Bangkok, except for some delays in clearance and occasional congestion, and is free to choose between rail and road transport between
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Bangkok and Nonghai. The choice depends on the type of cargo,
availability of wagons and comparative costs.
The real bottleneck in this transit route is the Mekong River
crossing. At both Nonghai and Thanaleng storage facilities are inadequate and the concrete ramps leading down to the river are so
steep that trucks sometimes roll or slide down them into the river.
Cargo handling equipment is inadequate and there are no provisions
for handling containers. For the river crossing itself, there are only
three ferries (of 50, 50 and 70 tons capacity), three tow boats and two
barges available. The ferries are ancient and in poor condition.
Working conditions and efficiency are better at Nonghai than in
Thanaleng, but are far from ideal. All of these problems of inadequate facilities are in the process of being remedied now, with new
Lao trucks and ferries enroute, new warehouses planned on both
sides of the river and other improvements planned or under way.
This is essential, for in 1979 this crossing handled 95 percent of lLao
imports and 55 percent of her exports. Since Thailand dosed the
border at Mukdahan/Savannaknet in July 1980, virtually all of
Laos' overseas trade has passed through here. 19
The only other border crossing point between Thailand and
Laos from 1978 to July 1980 was Mukdahan/Savannakhet. The primary transit goods using this route were Lao logs being exported and
petroleum products coming in. Three ferries of 60, 60 and 80 tons
capacity carry goods and there are 8 boats for passengers. All are
owned by private Thai entrepreneurs. The ramps down to the river
are not paved and are particularly dangerous in wet weather. There
is no rail service, but the highways serving both towns are good.
Cargo handling equipment, warehouses and other facilities, however, are seriously deficient even if Thailand again permits use of
this crossing, Laos may choose not to use it. She is currently building a new transit port at Ken Kabao, 27 km. upstream from Savannakhet as part of her program to reorient a large part of her transit
traffic from Thailand to Vietnam. The plan is to use the Mekong for
transport between Houeisay and Ken Kabao and truck transport
over Route 9 between Ken Kabao/Savannakhet and Danang.
The French Governor-General in 1898 conceived the idea of a
railroad connecting Laos with the east coast, but construction did not
begin until the 1930s. In 1937 about 11 miles of the projected U719. At Nonghai there are also passenger ferries crossing the Mekong to Thadua,
Laos, adjacent to Thanaleng. These "ferries" are little more than large canoes with inboard engines mounted amidships and can accommodate only about a dozen people
seated on benches around the sides.
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mile line between Tanap and Thakhek was opened to traffic. A 25mile ropeway was also constructed across the Mugia pass between
Xam Cue and Ban Naphao which operated until March 1945. Then,
because of increasing costs in the mountains and low revenues from
the main Hanoi-Saigon railroad, construction was halted. Before
World War II three highways- numbers 7, 8 and 9- linked the Mekong with the coast, but they were never really functional and have
since degenerated even more.
Since relations with Thailand have worsened in recent years
and Laos has come under very considerable Vietnamese influence,
she is trying to revive these old routes, or develop even better ones.
This involves two important projects: improving transportation on
the Mekong and improving the roads through the mountains to the
coast. The first is also a prime objective of the Mekong Committee.20 This will involve removing rocks. dredging sandbars, charting
and marking channels, etc. This will enable the river to be used extensively for long hauls instead of solely for local traffic as at
present. 21
In October 1979 Laos signed an agreement with Vietnam for
port facilities at Danang and for Vietnamese transport of transit
goods. Even before this agreement, however, some Lao goods transited Vietnam, using the ports of Haiphong and Danang. The major
impediment to such transit is the deplorable state of the roads, especially in Laos. They can be used only in dry weather and only for
loads of under 20 tons (in some places only two tons). Another problem is that of too much one-way traffic: most imports are bound for
northern Laos while most exports originate in the south. At present
the emphasis is on upgrading Highway 9 to Danang, but it is possible that in the future the principal transit route through Vietnam will
be Highway 8 to Vinh. 22
While air transport has since 1975 become very important
within Laos, international air transport is still rudimentary. Under a
1978 agreement there is one flight a week in each direction between
20. The Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin
was established in 1957 by the four riparian States - Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and
South Vietnam - to plan the integrated, multipurpose development of the basin with the
air of many regional, international and national agencies.
21. In 1980 it was estimated that only 2.8 percent of the volume of all Lao freight was
carried by river. There were only 37 Lao river vessels, of which 32 were antiquated
barges. These figures are likely to grow larger in coming years.
22. Vietnam has been helping Laos upgrade Highway 9 and COMECON has undertaken to help with Highways 7 and 9, according to Lee Yong Leng, Southeast Asia and
the Law of the Sea, Revised Edition, Singapore University Press, 1980.
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Bangkok and Vientiane and some service between Vientiane and
Hanoi and Singapore. These flights carry very litte cargo. Interestingly, though, Laos has since 1978 been a transit State for Vietnam.
Seeds, medicines and other high-value aid goods come from Europe
and Australia by plane to Bangk~k and move by truck to the Vientiane airport, whence they are flown to Hanoi. It seems unlikely,
however, that air cargo will be very important for Lao overseas trade
for some time to come.
(b) Lao Transit Problems

Many of the problems faced by Laos in her transit trade have
been discussed above. The two outstanding ones, however, remain
to be covered, at least in sketchy form. They are the very complex
procedures and the high costs involved in transiting Thailand.
The first known detailed study of this situation was done in
1971?3 It covered the transit routes between Bangkok and the five
Lao entry points listed above, but concentrated on the most important, the route to Nonghai. At that time, trucks carried all but goods
that required special care or were too big and needed rail transport,
and ETO had an official monopoly on truck transport. ETO used a
subcontractor, Eaa Peng Chieng (EPC), for all intransit trucking and
it also did some of the hauling between Thanaleng and Vientiane.
Pol products, technically third country imports, were actually imported from Thailand since they were refined there. They were
shipped to Nonghai by private rail and truck transporters and thence
by ferry to Thanaleng. The major and persistent Lao complaints
were about delays in shipments and high freight charges by ETO. In
addition, considerable sums of "tea money" had to be paid along the
way to highway and local police, customs officials and others.
These observations have been confirmed and elaborated upon
by several United Nations experts (and by this writer) since 1971.
One pointed out, for example, that ETO freight rates for intransit
cargoes were higher than for domestic goods, quite to the contrary of
established international practice. ETO claimed that its charges included payment for such services as insurance, loading and unloading, facilitating customs clearance and shipping across the Mekong,
and guarding the shipments. In fact, however, these services are less
than satisfactory as well as being overpriced. Some Lao importers
23. Koosuwan, Thongchai, "Analysis of Transportation oflntransit Goods to Laos,"
Master's Thesis, Thammaset University, Bangkok, August 1971.
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even place their own guards on ETO trucks to try to reduce the damage and pilferage that plagues their transit shipments.
Some other Lao complaints concern congestion in the Port of
Bangkok, numerous public holidays when customs officials do not
work, requirement for advance payments for haulage from the port,
delays in identifying and handling bulky packages, cumbersome customs procedures, insufficient trucks in the port area, labor problems
in the port, Thai rather than Lao control of goods in transit, customs
inspection requiring unloading and reloading trucks at Nonghai,
confinement to the one port of entry into Laos, the various inadequacies of facilities described above, shortages of trucks for the haul
across Thailand, and on and on. Overwhelmingly, however, the
principal problems are the Mekong River crossing and the ETO
monopoly.24
The first may be solved to a large extent in the near future if the
Nonghai-Vientiane railway-cum-highway bridge over the Mekong is
ever built, as agreed upon by the two countries under the Mekong
Scheme over a decade ago. The second may be more difficult to
solve, entangled as it is with Thai politics and commercial considerations. Under increasing pressure, the Thai government has recently
asserted that Laos actually chose the ETO monopoly over two other
alternatives, and claim that they are willing to consider joint transportation development companies, as recommended many times by
Lao officials and importers and by UN experts.
Meanwhile, project RAS/72/077 has been operating in Laos
since September 1979, doing the same kind of detailed, basic studies
as in Afghanistan and Nepal. The project was designed to helping to
train Lao nationals in transit operations and otherwise, under very
difficult conditions of poor infrastructure, novice officials and civil
strife, all of which hinder communications and mobility, doing what
it can to ease the transit problems of the country. One concrete accomplishment was finalization of the purchase of trailer-hauling
truck tractors with money from the UN Special Fund for Landlocked Developing Countries.
With all this, the fact remains that Laos has very little leverage
in negotiating with Thailand for better transit arrangements and
lower charges. The Thai government maintains tight control over
24. In 1980, transit costs for imports broke down this way: port charges 22 percent,
transshipment charges 12 percent, clearing fees 6 percent, customs charges 3 percent, and
transportation between Bangkok and Thanaleng 57 percent. This extraordinarily high
cost for transport appears to be due entirely to the ETO monopoly.
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the whole process, even though one of the original reasons for it illegal re-export of luxury goods from Laos into Thailand and deflection of such goods into Thailand before they reach Laos - is no
longer relevant. It seems to have been replaced by a new concern,
what the Thais refer to as "security" considerations. One observer,
noting the several closings of the border by Thailand since 1975 on
these grounds, has commented, "It is a good illustration of a landlocked state at an ideological boundary suffering from the enmity of
its neighbor." 25
6.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

What does all this mean? What can we learn from a study of
these three Asian land-locked countries and their transit problems?
We have already examined these problems in some detail and
reached some conclusions about them individually. Now it seems
appropriate to see if the three cases form patterns of any kind and if
the patterns conform to the generalizations about land-locked states
made in the introduction. Then we shall review briefly the six approaches to resolution of the problems discussed in the introduction
and see how relevant they are to the cases of Afghanistan, Nepal and
Laos. Finally, we can project a bit into the future and suggest a
reasonable picture of the transit situation in light of past patterns
and current developments.
In terms of physical geography, the three countries exhibit important similarities and some differences. In all three the proportion
of levelland is small and both Afghanistan and Nepal are dominated by mountain ranges among the world's most massive. Only in
Afghanistan are there high mountains in the middle of the country.
but rugged tarrain makes travel difficult in the others as well. All
three countries experience wet and dry seasons; overall, Afghanistan
is the driest, Nepal and the wettest and Laos in between. All three
are drained by significant rivers, but in Afghanistan only the Helmand may be considered large, while Nepal has a number of large
rivers flowing into India and Laos is blessed with the mighty Mekong and its tributaries which someday might provide her with a
true outlet to the sea. Laos appears to be the most highly mineralized of the three, but Afghanistan has important iron ore and natural
25. Lee Yong Leng,supra note 22, p. 47. This observation seems more relevant now
than ever, since it was reported in late 1980 that Thailand had completely closed its
border with Laos. No other information is available on this closure.
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gas reserves. Forests are important resources in Nepal and Laos, but
are rapidly disappearing because of poor management.
Historically and culturally, the countries are quite different.
Laos is the only one of the three to have been colonized by Europeans; Afghanistan and Nepal have long been classic independent
buffer States. All are ethnically heterogeneous, but Afghanistan is
predominantly Muslim, Nepal Hindu and Laos Buddhist. All three
have been strongly influenced culturally by their neighbors: Afghanistan by Persia, Nepal by Tibet and India, and Laos by China and
Thailand. Nepal and Laos have had little contact with the outside
world until recently, while Afghanistan for millenia has been a crossroads of Asia.
Economically, all three are predominantly agricultural, though
industrialization has begun modestly in Afghanistan and Nepal. All
export chiefly commodities and import chiefly manufactured goods,
including petroleum products. Laos has the smallest foreign trade of
the three, though conceivably, with its great untapped mineral resources, it has the greatest potential. All have very weak infrastructures, Laos weakest of all, and all are trying to improve them with
foreign assistance. As for transit, each country has advantages not
shared by the others: Afghanistan's truck routes to Europe, Nepal's
multiple entry/exit points along the Indian border, and Loas' relatively efficient route through Thailand. But each suffers unique liabilities as well: Afghanistan's generally poor relations with her
erstwhile principal transit State, Nepal's confinement to a single seaport for transit, Laos' almost total absence of third country trade by
air. Afghanistan and Laos already act, in a modest way, as transit
states for their neighbors, while conceivably in the future trade could
flow between Tibet and India through Nepal.
Politically, the three countries are quite different. Afghanistan
and Nepal were once verymuch larger during periods of aggressive
expansion but have lost territory partly as a result of European activity .. Afghanistan and Laos were until the 1970s traditional monarcl}ies and Nepal still is. Afghanistan and Laos now have communist
governments aligned with the Soviet Union (Afghanistan under Soviet occupation, Laos partly through Vietnam and partly directly),
while Nepal enjoys some measure of democracy. Despite occasional
strains, Nepal has long been on good terms with her only two neighbors, while Afghanistan has good. relations only with the USSR
among her four neighbors and Laos only with Vietnam among her
five neighbors. While all three can offer something to their neigh-
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bors in exchange for transit rights and facilities, none is in a strong
bargaining position.
Summing up, we can fairly say that all three countries match
the generalization made in the introduction about developing landlocked countries: By world standards, all are small, poor and weak.
All three countries have, indeed, also sought to overcome these
handicaps, which are common to all "least developed" countries but
greatly exacerbated by the lack of a sovereign seacoast, by each of
the six methods described in the introduction. In the case studies we
have emphasized four of them: bilateral negotions with transit
States; internal development, particularly of transportation; improvements in transit facilities, including development of alternate
routes; and the work of the United Nations, especially of the United
Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development and the United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. It might be useful to
say a bit more about the remaining two: regional integration and
cooperation, and international law.
Of all the world's major regions, Asia is the least organized.
There is no region-wide intergovernmental organization comparable
in any way to such groups as the Organization of American States,
the Council of Europe, the Organization of African Unity or the
South Pacific Commission. The entity closest to them is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which only came to life after the
communist takeovers in Indochina in 1975, is still not a very significant force in the region, and has only five members, none of which is
land-locked. There is no tradition of unity or concerted action in the
region, no sense of common identity or destiny. There is no movement whatever toward economic integration and even such regional
cooperation as exists has been stimulated, nurtured and financed
from outside the region, notably by ESCAP, the Asian Development
Bank and the Colombo Plan. The Asian Highway and the Mekong
Scheme are the only two regional projects so far, and both of them
involve one or more of the countries we are examining here.
Significantly, Asia is the only region in the world where transit
states (USSR, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand and Vietnam) insist
that transit is strictly a bilateral matter and refuse to consider any
sort of regional transit system or even adhere to internationally
adopted legal instruments or practices designed to aid the free flow
of commerce for the benefit of all. China, which borders all five
Asian land-locked countries, is not yet an important transit state for
any of them and has not taken a forceful position on transit matters.
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India and Pakistan have been the least cooperative of the transit
states, and only Thailand has endorsed Project RAS/72/077. It is
likely to be a long time before cooperation in transit matters reaches
the level it has in Europe, Africa or South America.
As for international law, we gave a summary of relevant developments in the introduction. It remains to say a little more about
UNCLOS Ill, the roles of Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos in it, and its
results as far as transit is concerned. First, it is fair to say that the
land-locked states at UNCLOS III were outmaneuvered at the very
beginning, actually even before the conference began, at a series of
regional meetings in Africa and Latin America, and despite - or
perhaps because of- their alliance with the so-called geographically disadvantaged states, never regained any of their losses and
never really played a major role in the conference. This was true in
spite of the persistent, often skillful and sometimes heroic leadership
of a few delegates from Land-locked countries. Among them were,
in the early years, Abdul Hakim Tabibi of Afghanistan and a little
later Shailendra Kumar Upadhyay of Nepal.
The full story of the role of the land-locked states at UNCLOS
III is yet to be told, though a number of articles have dealt with
certain aspects of it. 26 Summarizing briefly, we can say that they
threw away all of their bargaining power by accepting the notion of
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the interst of "Third World
Solidarity" before UNCLOS III opened in 1973, without obtaining a
quidpro quo. Thereafter, all their energies were concentrated on trying to get back a small part of what they had given away. In the end,
they retained their right to sail their own ships flying their own flag,
won theoretically equal access to and voice in the management of
the mineral resources of the International Seabed Area along with
coastal States, and managed to gain only greatly circumscribed access to a tiny fraction of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. They retrieved no rights to the non-living resources of
the EEZ and nothing whatever from the considerably extended con26. A representative sample of the more recent ones might include: Cabello Sarubbi,
Oscar J., "La Participaci6n de los Estados sin litoral en la Tercera Conferencia de las
Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar, "Estudios Paraguayos, Vol. 6, No.I, September 1978, pp. 63-84; Mirvahabi, Farin, "The Rights of the Land-locked and Geographi·
cally Disadvantaged States in Exploitation of Marine Fisheries," Netherlands
International Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1979, pp. 130-162; and Sinjela, A. Mpazi,
"Freedom of Transit and the Right of Access for Land-locked States: The Evolution of
Principle and Law," Georgia Journal oflntemational and Comparative Law, Vol. 12, No.
1, 1982.
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tinental shelf. As far as the transit provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea are concerned, they represent only
a slight net gain over the 1965 New York Convention and very little
more than the relevant provisions, broadly interpreted, of the Barcelona Convention and Statute of 1921.
Very briefly, Part X of the Convention provides for a right of
access to and from the sea and freedom (not a right) of transit for
land-locked states reasonably satisfactory definitions of terms, emphasis on bilateral agreements for details of transit arrangements, a
sweeping provision that transit states "shall have the right to take all
measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided
for in this part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their
legitimate interests" (Article 125.3), exclusion of application of the
most-favored-nation clause, exemption of traffic in transit from
charges other than fees for services rendered, non-discrimination in
setting of charges and taxes for means of transport, free zones at
ports of entry and exit, cooperation in the construction and improvement of means of transport, requirement for the transit state to avoid
delays of traffic in transit, equal treatment in maritime ports, and
allowance for the granting of facilities greater than those provided
for in the Convention.
In essence the Convention simply lays out guidelines, a
franework which must be fleshed out by bilateral, subregional and
regional arrangements, and a datum plane or standard against which
such arrangements can be measured. It solves no problems, lays out
no inflexible rules, and is clearly weighted in favor of transit states.
Nevertheless, if widely adopted and accepted as binding international law by transit states, it can form the foundation for a very real
improvement in the transit situation of land-locked countries in the
decades to come.
The land-locked countries, however, particularly those in Asia,
cannot rely solely or even largely on international law, no matter
how favorably interpreted and applied, to solve their geographical
handicap of separation from the sea. This problem, after all, is fundamentally political and in the long run only good relations with the
transit states can come close to solving the problem. Meanwhile and in addition- they will have to pursue all the other means available to them. This will not be easy, particularly in Asia, but the
effort must be made and the rest of the world should cooperate to the
maximum extent possible.
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